Forward Secrecy Attack on Privacy-Preserving Machine Authenticated Key Agreement for Internet of Things
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.47852/AAES32021937Keywords:
Internet of Things, authenticated key agreement, forward secrecy, privacy, security, cryptographyAbstract
Internet of things (IoT) is to connect billions of devices and machines via Internet and to have a smart system. Sensors and devices in IoT environment are connected and communicated together. Connecting such a huge number of devices requires high level of security and privacy. A crucial characteristic of ubiquitous IoT devices is their limited resources. In recent times, a scheme for privacy-preserving machine authenticated key agreement scheme (PPMAKA) has been introduced for the IoT environment. It was argued that PPMAKA providessecurity and privacy at the same time including forward secrecy. Nevertheless, this paper will demonstrate that PPMAKA lacks forward secrecy, a crucial security, and privacy feature in the IoT environment. We use Cannetti and Krawzyck threat model for the detailed analysis of PPMAKA. Furthermore, we provide remarks for the future research as it is recommendable to design any security and privacy schemes over IoT environments with lightweight operation and communication property, authenticated key agreement with forward secrecy, anonymity, and unlinkability.
Received: 24 October 2023 | Revised: 14 November 2023 | Accepted: 1 December 2023
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest to this work.
Data Availability Statement
Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were created or analyzed in this study.
Author Contribution Statement
Batamu Anderson Chiphiko: Conceptualization, Methodology, Formal analysis, Investigation, Writing - original draft, Writing - review & editing, Visualization; Hyunsung Kim: Conceptualization, Writing - review & editing, Visualization, Supervision, Project administration; Patrick Ali: Validation, Resources, Project administration; Levis Eneya: Validation, Resources.
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Copyright (c) 2023 Authors
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.